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Abstract 
The analysis of wage distribution has attracted scholars from different disciplines seeking to 
develop theoretical arguments to explain the upward or downward trend. In particular, how 
middle management wage premium changes in different contexts is a relatively neglected 
area of research. This study argues that wage distribution changes in different contexts, 
representing different forms of capitalism. To shed light on this, we considered the size and 
the shape of the wage premium to supervision paid to middle managers in Germany and the 
UK. We find evidence of two forms of context: middle managers are paid differently for the 
same task according to the economy where they work; of this amount, about half of the 
difference is related to the context. We frame the analysis within the literature on Variety of 
Capitalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies on remuneration have concentrated on two groups: blue-collar or menial 
workers (Dencker and Fang 2016) and CEOs or senior managers (Deng and Gao 2013). 
Research has thus neglected an important aspect, namely skilled middle managers, who 
constitute a significant portion of the labour force (McNulty and Brewster 2019). From their 
viewpoint, some countries are more attractive than others, which affects the overall 
performance of economies (Özçelik et al. 2019). Self-reported earnings satisfaction is one 
area that has been explored, albeit modestly. In addition to this work on subjective 
perceptions, there is a need for objective measures to explain the different remuneration of 
middle managers in different contexts. That is, there is a lack of research into why they find 
one labour market more appealing than another. This particular focus is relevant, in that 
studies on different countries and industries show the great importance of supervisors in 
shaping the perceptions of employees and organisational functioning (Škerlavaj et al. 2016). 
This article refers to the varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) literature on the economics of 
industry organisation and firms’ strategic choices in countries with different forms of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). This literature suggests that economic and cultural 
diversity generates dissimilarity in employment relations. Following Hall and Soskice (2001), 
this article studies Germany and the United Kingdom as examples of alternative models of 
capitalism and industrial relations: the former a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), the 
latter a Liberal Market Economy (LME). Both labour markets, for different reasons, have 
been quite attractive to immigrant workers. Both have been open to waves of skilled 
migrants, acknowledging their value for firms, regions and the nation. The proportion of 
highly educated immigrants is higher in the UK than in most of other European countries 
(Bryson and White 2019).  
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This article contributes to the literature in three ways. It estimates the distributions of 
middle managers’ wages in the two countries and analyses how each shapes remuneration 
and the wage premium to supervision (WPS). Middle managers are defined as employees 
with responsibility for organising and monitoring others. Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC 2009) data are used to estimate the wage distribution that would 
prevail if, other parameters equal, no employees were middle managers and compare it with 
the actual distribution, thus computing the WPS in the UK and Germany at all deciles. The 
portion of this difference that depends on the national context is measured, generalising the 
approach of Blau and Kahn (1996), which studies international differences between the 
average of the wage distributions, to the entire wage distribution. This is a good method for 
estimating the effect of context on the WPS. This article is the first to follow the data analysis 
process set out below, taking a new approach to analysing remuneration practices through the 
VoC lens. 
The second contribution is new empirical evidence, extending and further supporting VoC 
theory. This study develops a new tool to examine the impact of context on employees’ 
remuneration and sets out new evidence supporting Hall and Soskice (2001), suggesting that 
context does indeed shape the wage distribution, over and above individual, job and firm 
characteristics; specifically, this analysis contributes to the VoC debate on governance in 
Germany and Britain. 
The third contribution is to the literature on the middle management wage premium. A 
number of scholars have looked into the sources of international differences in CEO 
compensation, including those between Germany and the UK (Bruce et al. 2005; Fernandes 
et al. 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2005), but this is the first empirical evaluation of WPS 
differences. The questions raised may be relevant for two reasons. First, the resources going 
to supervisory employees represent an opportunity cost where they could be allocated to 
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more profitable activities (perhaps higher wages to other workers). Secondly, it contends that 
the WPS is determined by context variables such as labour market institutions, corporate 
structure, and firm organisation (Acemoglu and Newman 2002). 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the literature and 
describes the data and the procedures. The concluding section sets out the key findings, with 
discussion of theoretical and policy implications.  
EXISTING RESEARCH 
Middle Managers and Wage Premium 
Studies of employee remuneration have mainly taken two directions. On the one hand, the 
literature has identified individual characteristics shaping the distribution of wages (DiNardo 
et al. 1996). On the other, researchers have focussed on the determinants of employee 
compensation, especially at the top of the hierarchy (Jensen and Murphy 1990). In this, the 
role of the WPS is a relatively neglected area of research. This is an important gap to fill 
because, as theory suggests, the WPS is likely to affect wage inequality (Rueda and 
Pontusson 2000). The remuneration of CEOs and top executives is known to be less strongly 
affected by the context (Greckhamer 2016), as their compensation is dominated by the 
variable component, whereas the WPS represents a fixed component. As noted, the WPS also 
represents an opportunity cost where resources could be directed to more productive uses 
(Bernhardt 1995). And most importantly, it is driven by the broader economic context 
(Acemoglu and Newman 2002). 
Varieties of Capitalism: Germany vs. the UK 
Research on employment relations has used the VoC framework to understand patterns of 
HRM practices in different labour markets (Kalleberg 2009). The original approach of Hall 
and Soskice (2001) distinguishes two archetypes of market economy, CME and LME, the 
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essential difference being the mode of coordination that employers favour. Germany and 
Britain are used as examples of alternative types of capitalism or contexts (Baccaro and 
Howell 2017). The UK is an LME, stock-market-centred and characterised by shareholder-
favouring firms and institutions. Hall and Soskice (2001) describe a fluid UK labour market 
where workers can be dismissed at short notice, enabling British firms to sustain losses of 
market share. In this type of economy, firms coordinate their activities primarily via 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, and equilibrium outcomes are given by 
supply and demand conditions in competitive markets. The UK financial services industry 
has been dominant for decades, making market competition more important than regulation 
and emphasising financial incentives for managers. Overall, British companies are more 
concerned with profits and dividends than their German counterparts (Vitols 2001). 
Germany is characterised instead by employee-favouring firms within a corporate culture 
in which employees perceive the company as a community, with the State assigned to 
regulate and promote cooperation. Germany operates as a CME, characterised by the role of 
the government as producer of public goods; it has retained its traditional manufacturing 
sector while developing a context that supports science-based start-ups. The labour market is 
marked by strong social insurance and protection, commitment to standards and stable 
employment relations. Firms depend on non-market relationships for coordination with other 
actors, and the context accordingly fosters long-term employment strategies, making lay-offs 
a less common response to declining returns. These features are evident in the Hartz reforms 
and the representation of German workers on corporate supervisory boards (Eichhorst and 
Marx 2011) . 
More recently, scholars have analysed the tendency to convergence among different types 
of economy. The liberalisation thesis posits that the two archetypes are not actually that 
dissimilar, with LME features penetrating the CMEs (Streeck 2008). Recent work on VoC 
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and worker mobility similarly points to these changes. Even so, Hall and Thelen (2009) tend 
to agree that significant differences between LMEs and CMEs persist. Recent research 
suggests that for studies of employment relations the VoC framework is still valid (Hassard 
and Morris 2018; Hertwig et al. 2018; Kornelakis 2014). For example, Farndale et al. (2017) 
offer evidence of substantial variation in HRM practices between the two types of economy. 
Compensation practices, such as the wage premium, are regulated at national level (Festing 
2012), with very considerable differences. In line with this literature, the present article 
acknowledges that wage bargaining and compensation practices are severely constrained at 
institutional level, with fundamental differences rooted in the different nature of LMEs and 
CMEs. Discretion in compensation and inequality are expected to be less pronounced where 
there is more regulation (Thelen 2001), as in CMEs; greater discretion is expected in LMEs. 
Research shows that the UK labour market is associated with de-regulation and polarisation 
(Sisson et al. 2018). 
It is here hypothesised that British middle managers should earn a higher WPS than their 
German counterparts, and that the difference increases with rank. Similarly, the distribution 
of the WPS should be considerably more unequal in the UK (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). 
The following hypotheses are accordingly formulated: 
Hypothesis 1a: The WPS helps shape the distribution of wages in Germany and the UK. 
Hypothesis 1b: The middle management WPS is higher in the UK than in Germany. 
Hypothesis 1c: The difference between the WPS in UK and Germany increases as wage 
levels rise. 
The question, then, is how much of the difference in WPS is due to the different contexts. 
Compensation practices are shaped by corporate governance mechanisms, which are path- 
and context-dependent (Brewster et al. 2008). The VoC framework posits that firms are 
embedded in their national environment and emphasises institutional interaction effects. 
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Thus, firms’ decisions and practices are affected by multiple factors. Different types of 
economy display diverse patterns of HRM in response to local institutional factors (Jackson 
and Deeg 2008). Firms are affected by the local norms and culture, to which their practices 
must conform (Farndale et al. 2017). This suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: The context helps shape the WPS. 
A second body of literature, rooted in labour economics, helps in understanding the 
features of the British and German labour markets and addresses the research question 
proposed here. Specifically, the evidence shows that the British labour market is now 
characterised by marked polarisation between high-paid and lower-paid positions (Goos and 
Manning 2007; Salverda and Mayhew 2009), which digitisation has accentuated. Germany is 
considered the archetype of a continental “European” welfare state, where employment 
protections are stronger. Brücker et al. (2014) find that there is less wage flexibility in 
Germany than in Britain. Specifically, the WPS is determined by contextual factors, such as 
labour market institutions, corporate structure, and firm organisation (Acemoglu and 
Newman 2002). 
This article draws on these two lines of research, one maintaining that LMEs and CMEs 
produce country-specific norms and corporate behaviour, the second shedding light on the 
specific characteristics of each type:  
Hypothesis 2b: The effect of the context on the WPS to middle managers is greater in 
Germany than in the UK for low wages. 
METHODS 
Dataset 
The question of empirical measurement of the WPS has been relatively unexplored, owing 
chiefly to the absence of datasets permitting international comparisons and the lack of a 
common European definition of middle manager (Baker and Holmström 1995).  
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The present study exploits the cross-sectional EU-SILC dataset for 2009,1  which is widely 
used to test predictions derived from socio-economic theories in different economies 
(Bünning and Pollmann-Schult 2016; Dotti Sani and Scherer 2018; Sánchez-Mira and 
O’Reilly 2019). The survey uses common questionnaire, guidelines, definitions and 
procedures for all the EU economies and weights the data to account for unit non-responses 
and other problems of attrition. The results reported here reflect these weighted data. This 
study, indeed, is a good example of the advantages the dataset offers, insofar as both the 
sampling strategy and the definition of middle manager are common to the two countries. In 
line with the theoretical definition in Leonard (1987), Acemoglu and Newman (2002), and 
Beaudry and Francois (2010), EU-SILC defines middle manager as an employee with: 
formal responsibility for supervising a group of other employees … directly, at 
times doing some of the work they supervise … The supervisor or foreman takes 
charge of, directs the work and controls that it be properly done (EU-SILC, 
2009:195). 
The survey also provides information on many characteristics of the job 
(permanent/temporary, full-time/part-time), firm (size, sector of activity), and individual 
(age, citizenship, gender, education, skills). Several covariates serve to control for omitted-
variable bias and self-selection. Despite the large number of variables, fewer than 1% of the 
observations are lost. 
The dependent variable is the (natural) logarithm of monthly gross wages. Table 1 reports 
preliminary evidence for the three sets of variables. The final sample consisted of 8,588 
 
1EU-SILC provides detailed information on both Germany and the UK, among other countries. The data were 
collected through interviews, asper the Commission regulation on sampling and tracing rules (No. 1982/2003 of 
21 October 2003). For all components the longitudinal data are drawn from a nationally representative 
probability sample of the resident population in private households. All private households and all persons aged 
16 and over within the household are eligible. Representative probability samples have to be achieved both for 
households, which form the basic units of sampling, data collection and data analysis, and for individuals in the 
target population. The sampling frame and methods of sample selection must ensure that every individual and 
household is assigned a known, non-zero probability of selection. The cross-sectional sample sizes were 
calculated so as to achieve a sample of 121,000 households in Europe. The national allocation aims at ensuring a 
minimum precision level. For a detailed technical account of the sampling process for all the economies 
surveyed, and for Germany and the UK in particular, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-
union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions and here https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/3249af08-02d3-4f53-
bd0d-aaeae0b2663e/KS-RA-10-021-EN-N_web%20(2).pdf. 
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employees in Germany and 6,609 in the UK. Britain had a higher percentage of middle 
managers. In Britain middle managers earned an average €3,474.70 a month, other 
employees €1,920.11. The corresponding figures for Germany were €2,924.85 and 
€1,627.57. 
Please insert Table 1  
The data indicate that middle managers are younger than other employees in the UK, older 
in Germany. They also showed more men in middle management positions in Germany, and 
smaller differences in education and skills between middle managers and other employees. 
Finally, most individuals were employed in firms with more than 10 employees. By sector, 
German middle managers were relatively concentrated in manufacturing, mining and 
electricity, while their sectoral distribution in the UK was more uniform. 
The Distribution of Wages in Germany and the UK 
The differences between the wages of middle managers and other employees were also 
evident in the wage distributions in the two economies (Figure 1). These distributions were 
estimated in a fully nonparametric framework, which allowed for analysis without imposing 
any shape at the outset; this approach is particularly effective in describing the characteristics 
of the sample, letting the data speak for themselves. 
The wage distribution of middle managers proves to dominate that of other employees, in 
both economies and at all wage levels. This does not differ greatly from the findings of 
studies based on average wages: middle managers earn more than other employees, and the 
difference is greater at higher deciles of the distribution. 
Please insert Figure 1  
Measuring the National WPS 
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The differences between the distributions shown in Figure 1 cannot be taken as a 
measurement of the WPS for middle management. They were constructed using a single 
characteristic as discriminant, namely “being a middle manager”, but these results also 
capture other characteristics likely to differ between middle managers and other employees, 
such as skills, gender, education, and sector of activity. Thus the difference between the two 
distributions in Figure 1 cannot be ascribed solely to the middle manager position, which is 
the focus of this study. 
What is needed is a decomposition method to gauge the effect of the middle managerial 
position only, keeping other variables constant. A number of methods have been developed to 
decompose changes or differences in the mean of an outcome variable with many possible 
independent variables. The most important is probably their extension to distributional 
parameters other than mean and variance. These techniques are of interest here, as the 
premium will presumably be different in the two economies and at different quantiles of the 
earnings distribution for each, depending importantly on the context. 
Di Nardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) suggest comparing the actual distribution of wages 
with the distribution that would prevail if, all things being equal, none of the individuals were 
a middle manager.2 There are different methods to obtain this distribution. This article adopts 
Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW), first proposed by Di Nardo, Fortin and Lemiex (1996). 
The procedure for decomposing changes in the density of wages was a generalisation of 
Oaxaca’s decomposition of changes in means. The decompositions were based on simple 
counterfactual densities such as “what would the density of wages have been if no employee 
was managing others, other things equal?” This “counterfactual” density can be determined 
by a “reweighting” function that estimates the probability of being a manager as a function of 
all the other characteristics to be kept constant. The difference between the actual and the 
 
2Details of the methodological approach adopted in this article are available in the Appendix. 
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counterfactual density of wages is exactly the amount that the economy pays simply for being 
employed as middle manager, defined here as the WPS.  
It is worth highlighting some limitations of this approach. The version of the EU-SILC 
dataset we have adopted is cross-sectional and, therefore, it lacks variation over time, which 
would be of help in assessing the direction of causality. Another limitation is that the method 
adopted here is preferable if the aim is to decompose the overall difference in the wage 
distributions into the explained and unexplained components. This suggests a limitation of 
the methodology relating to the aggregate nature of the measure of the role of context in the 
UK and Germany. In other words, even holding the large set of covariates considered 
constant, if any other relevant variable is missed its effect will end up in the WPS. To get a 
measure of the WPS that can be regarded as robust to the absence of potentially important 
confounders, a rich set of covariates has been developed, and the results are checked for 
robustness using a full IV approach. 
Comparing WPS in different countries 
Comparing Germany and Britain required the same specifications as the probit model used 
to reweight the observations. Hence, the general-to-specific approach was not applied, as this 
would have made the set of regressors economy-specific. Instead, the joint significance of 
four sets of variables was tested: 
(i) individual characteristics: education (4 categories: lower secondary or less, upper 
secondary, post-secondary, at least tertiary); work experience (and its square, cube 
and quartic); gender; marital status; and citizenship (2 dummies: national/non-
national, European/non-European);  
(ii) job characteristics (part time, full time, fixed-term, permanent); 
(iii) firm characteristics (size measured by 3 dummies, 13 economic sector dummies);  
(iv) individual skills (4 dummies measuring the skills required for the task).  
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The variables described in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) help deal with data heterogeneity, and 
control the results for education and work experience, gender, marital status, citizenship, job 
characteristics, firm characteristics and skills of the employee. The rationale for these sets of 
variables consists in the need to check for selection mechanisms into supervisory jobs, which 
Marsden (1990) among others suggest may be present to differing extents in the British and 
German job markets. This is a crucial point. If, for example, education, experience or 
individual skills of supervisors and other employees differ systematically, the former will 
self-select into more rewarding tasks. Hence, if these variables are not appropriately 
controlled for, the measure of the WPS applied here would be a combination of the reward 
for individual education, experience and skills, and of the WPS. 
More specifically, the variables in (i) control the estimated probabilities for selection 
mechanisms associated with work experience. It is known that job regulations in Germany 
emphasise work experience, and seniority is typically rewarded with career advancement 
(Eyraud et al. 1990). Germany is an example of an occupational labour market, while the UK 
accords greater importance to generic tertiary skills and occupational mobility. The variables 
in (ii) help control the estimates for different job characteristics. The share of temporary 
employment and that of part-time employment relative to overall employment are known to 
be two of the most relevant variables for identifying VoC typologies (Lallement 2011). The 
variables in (iii) are introduced as differentiating variables, as in Goergen et al. (2012), 
allowing to control for firm size and sector. Individual skills are also controlled for using the 
variable in (iv), as labour mobility between firms is greater in countries like the UK than in 
Germany, where workers find it harder to transfer their skills to another firm, so that career 
advancement is gained mostly within rather than between firms. In Britain, by contrast, job 
regulations are expected to emphasise workers’ skills and the inter-firm labour market. Such 
differences in mobility is likely to affect advancement in supervisory roles, so it has been 
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checked whether individual skills, not context, are responsible for international differences in 
the WPS.  Following Picchio and Mussida (2011), to control for individual skills the present 
study uses the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) These 
variables are associated with the type of job chosen by the individual.3 The categories range 
from relatively low-skilled jobs, such as plant and machine operators and assemblers, to 
higher-skilled jobs, such as professionals, legislators and senior officials, and CEO/non-CEO 
positions. The variables refer explicitly to the skill level: 
The basis for the classification in the ISCO-88 scheme is the nature of the job 
itself and the level of skills required. A job is defined as the set of tasks and 
duties to be performed. Skills are the abilities to carry out the tasks and duties of a 
job. Skills consist of two dimensions: skills level and domain specialization (EU-
SILC 2009:183). 
These variables have been adopted in empirical research and refer explicitly to the skill 
level required for the job (Böckerman and Maliranta 2013; Ortega 2009; Pemner and 
Lawrence 2004) , ranging from the relatively low-level skills needed to perform simple and 
routine physical or manual tasks (level 1) to those necessary to perform such tasks as 
operating machinery and electronic equipment (level 2) to higher-level skills required for 
professionals, legislators, and senior officials (level 3) and, finally, high-level skills such as 
literacy, numeracy and excellent communication (level 4). 
Measuring the Effect of the Context on the WPS 
The theoretical literature sees the WPS as influenced by context variables (Acemoglu and 
Newman 2002). To study the extent to which context shapes the wage distribution, one needs 
 
3The literature suggests that skills should be measured using panel data (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011). In 
the present case, however, this is not feasible, in that the EU-SILC survey data are cross-sectional. In this 
framework panel data are unattractive also since: 1) the probability model is non-linear, so the assumption of 
separability is unlikely to hold; and 2) disentangling individual effects is problematic, as individual fixed effects 
can be computed only if the individual has had both statuses (supervisor and non-supervisor) during the sample 
period. 
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a measurement of how much a German middle manager would earn, everything else equal, if 
he or she were doing the same job in the UK. The measurement selected is the difference 
between actual earnings of a German middle manager and potential earnings in the UK. The 
procedure begins with an estimate of the distribution that would have prevailed if, all other 
things equal, all German employees had been working in the UK. 
The key element was the re-weighting function for the German observations, as before, 
but taking “being a German employee” as dependent variable. The second step was 
estimating how much a German middle manager would earn in the UK. These weights were 
derived from the interaction between those used in measuring the WPS for Germany and 
those for the probability of being a German employee. This gave the appropriate reweighting 
function. Applied to the sample of German employees, this would yield the premium that 
German middle managers would have gotten in the UK. The difference between the actual 
WPS and that obtained using the counterfactual distribution gives the effect of the context. 
Note that because this is taken as the difference between the WPS actually earned and the 
theoretical WPS earned in the UK, the effect of potential self-selection into management 
positions is likely to be further attenuated. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of the auxiliary probit regression. Column (a) refers to 
Germany, with as independent variables individual, job, and firm characteristics, plus 
variables controlling for individual skills, added to the model reported in Column (b). The 
joint significance of variable groups was tested for, using the F-statistic (p-values in 
brackets). 
Table 2 about here  
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The model adapted reasonably well to the data, and all three groups of variables were 
statistically significant. The pseudo-R² is about 9%, not greatly different from other studies 
using similar datasets. More than 60% of the predictions turned out to be correct. Column (b) 
shows that the set of variables controlling for individual skills was statistically significant. 
The pseudo-R² increases to 10.5% and the percentage of correct predictions to 73.9%. 
Columns (c) and (d) report the results of the same analyses for the UK. Again the model fits 
the data well. Added to the set of regressors, the variables proxying for skills also raised the 
pseudo-R² (from 9.4% to 16.6%) and the percentage of correct predictions (from 66.6% to 
71.0%). This specification has been preferred in calculating the set of weights and performing 
the exercise. 
Does the WPS differ between Germany and the UK?  
Figure 2 reports both the actual and the counterfactual wage distributions for the UK and 
for Germany. Some statistics based on these distributions are reported in Table 3. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (top panel) rejects the hypothesis of equality of actual and 
counterfactual distributions for both economies. This implies that the WPS does indeed affect 
the distribution of wages significantly (Hypothesis 1a). The bottom panel presents the WPS 
measurement, Figure 3 the results at the mean and at different quantiles of the distribution. At 
the mean wage in Britain, the WPS was nearly 26% (€899.70) compared with 16% in 
Germany (€467.90). And the WPS also differed at different deciles of the earnings 
distribution. The WPS curve was U-shaped in both countries, but the minimum was near the 
40th percentile in the UK and the 80th in Germany. That is, the WPS for middle managers 
tended to increase inequality more in Britain than in Germany, where the WPS is lower for 
all the deciles (Hypothesis 1b). Moreover, the difference in WPS for the two economies 
tended to increase over all the deciles. The evidence, that is, supports Hypothesis 1c, namely 
that the difference between the two countries is sharper for middle managers at higher grades. 
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Please insert Figures 2 and 3  
Please insert Table 3  
How much of the difference between the WPSs is due to context (type of capitalism)?  
To answer this question, a probability model was estimated, with probability of being a 
German employee as dependent variable. Table 4 reports the results of an auxiliary 
regression showing that, as above, the preferred model included skills as explanatory 
variables. This model was used to recover the set of weights with the results for the 
distribution presented in Figure 4. Panel 1 reports the distribution of wages that would have 
prevailed if German employees had been working in the UK. Panel 2 reports the distribution 
with no middle managers and the distribution with no middle managers and with German 
employees working in the UK. 
Please insert Table 4  
Please insert Figure 4  
These distributions allowed calculation of the effect of the context at different wage levels 
(Table 5). On average, German middle managers, given their characteristics, would earn 
7.9% more working in the UK. Hence, the data suggest that 50% of the WPS in Germany 
depended directly on the context. The decile-by-decile analysis shows that context affects 
WPS throughout the distribution, but less strongly at the higher deciles (Hypothesis 2a). This 
accords with the thesis that the German context moderates wage inequality, an impression 
reinforced by comparison with the British context (Hypothesis 2b). Note that up to the 40th 
percentile German middle managers would have had a higher WPS than their British 
counterparts had they been working in the UK. 
Please insert Table 5 
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As noted, the control variables serve to deal with the problem of data heterogeneity and 
self-selection. However, the decision to supervise other employees may also depend on 
confounders that could be omitted, above all the extra pay remunerating supervisory 
responsibilities. That is, another possible control for self-selection and omitted-variable bias 
is simply the wage attached to the supervisory role. The effect of wages on the forecasting 
ability of the reweighting functions, either taken as predetermined or, as suggested by Currie 
and Madrian (1999), instrumented using individual health, has been estimated. The results do 
not alter the conclusions on the impact of the context on WPS. (To save space, they are 
available only in the Appendix).  
DISCUSSION 
The significant empirical findings here contribute to the literature on varieties of capitalism 
and their impact on the wage premium for supervision, with implications for theory and 
policy. The data corroborate the thesis that the remuneration of middle managers differs 
substantially between types of economy, reflecting key contextual characteristics. Some 
contend that country classifications by VoC category may not fit the real-world data (Amable 
2008). This inquiry identifies two stylised facts showing that Britain and Germany do 
correspond to the LME and CME ideal-types (Hall and Soskice 2001) and, more, it provides 
strong empirical evidence, extending our understanding of how wage compensation practices 
depend on institutional context. The data indicate that the WPS for middle managers differs 
between the two economies both in magnitude and in the shape of the curve, owing in part to 
the context. The British WPS increases quite steadily from the bottom to the top of the wage 
distribution, producing considerable inequality, whereas the German WPS has a more 
balanced impact. In keeping with the VoC hypothesis, these differences reflect the divergent 
models of LMEs and CMEs. In Britain the WPS was greater at higher earnings deciles, in 
harmony with the description of British capitalism as incentive-based, while for German 
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middle managers it was greater at the lower end and increased less sharply, producing a less 
unequal distribution that could be interpreted as protecting middle managers early during 
their careers.  
The findings make it clear that one paradigm prevails in Germany, another in the UK. 
There is evidence of some diffusion of market liberalisation in Germany, corresponding more 
to the LME than the CME model (Jackson and Sorge 2012); overall, however, the data show 
that managerial remuneration practices differ significantly between the two countries, with 
implications for the mobility of skilled workers and countries’ ability to attract them. 
Some interesting policy implications emerge. The German economy is confirmed as more 
protective, as argued by Dore (2000). Workers at early career stages enjoy a certain degree of 
job security, in keeping with models of political economy that see mitigation of inequality as 
a virtue of modern democracy (Iversen and Soskice 2006). However, this result could be seen 
in the light of the work of Streeck (1997; 2008), who posits the universal evolution of 
capitalistic society, in particular Germany, towards disorganisation. He points to the 
transformation of German capitalism, now far removed from the original model of pure 
coordinated market economy, having moved towards ever greater earnings differentiation. In 
his view (Streeck 2014), a dogmatic view of the various capitalisms as non-converging 
cannot grasp the complex dynamics that are re-shaping European labour markets. The British 
economy, by contrast, rewards management careers more generously, with higher earnings 
premiums for managers at the higher deciles. 
To curb the “brain drain” towards LMEs, CME policy makers could encourage higher 
remuneration for middle managers in the top income quantiles. However, the mobility of 
skilled workers has become a controversial, political issue. While migration carries clear 
systemic benefits in terms of human and financial capital, it generates discontent among the 
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locals who compete for the same jobs. This competition has triggered social tensions that 
policy makers have countered by erecting barriers to mobility. 
The study also contributes methodologically, developing a new method for estimating the 
effects of context in determining WPS, validating Blau and Kahn (1996), and extending the 
analysis of the international difference in the average wage distribution to differences in the 
entire distribution. The hypothesis examined is: What would be the result in Germany if its 
middle managers were working in the UK? This question is successfully answered, but the 
analysis is cross-sectional, which prevents any inference concerning changes in either the 
German or the British context over time. For example, Streek and Thelen (2005) discuss the 
transformation of the institutional context in developed economies in recent years. Thelen 
(2014) describes recent changes that make the German model less egalitarian, 
notwithstanding the persistence of such practices as offering greater job security in exchange 
for lower wages (Hall and Thelen 2009). Thelen also highlights the trend towards diversity 
within national systems (Palier and Thelen 2010) with the institutionalisation of new forms of 
dualism. Data either having greater cross-sectional scope or allowing a historical review 
would provide more insight. 
The findings also carry implications for the possible impact of Brexit on the UK’s ability 
to retain or attract skilled foreigners, suggesting that there will not necessarily be a diaspora 
of supervisors: other conditions equal, the British labour market offers them greater 
incentives. However, whether Britain’s WPS edge over Germany will be sufficient to retain 
present supervisors or attract new ones depends on a series of tangible and intangible factors. 
The former are the extent to which immigration policy favours their entry and the ability of 
the major economic actors to influence political choices towards social inclusiveness. The 
latter are the shared social values that could make foreigners perceive Britain as open and 
welcoming. 
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This analysis raises questions for further research. First, the comparison here is between 
ideal-types of CME and LME. But data for all the EU economies are available, so if the 
difficulties of comparing such a heterogeneous set of economies can be overcome, the 
analysis could be extended to all the types of economy within the EU, interpreting the results 
within the VoC framework. Second, this analysis could be replicated also using longitudinal 
datasets, to study the impact of contextual changes on the WPS. The joint presence of time-
varying data, cross-sectional EU data, and data on change in British immigration policy 
would be invaluable. If Brexit eventually comes about, then once its terms and conditions are 
established and recorded in the EU-SILC data, an inquiry along the present lines will shed 
light on the impact on the WPS and the subsequent attractiveness of the British system. 
These are not the only unexplored aspects. Some questions not considered here suggest 
potential avenues for future research. For instance, different forms of capitalism should 
presumably produce different forms of wealth and different societal structures. While the 
results here indicate that German middle managers would earn higher WPS if they worked in 
the UK, it is impossible to speculate on the degree of satisfaction or happiness of a German-
raised person working in Britain, or vice versa. Finally, the results cannot be readily 
generalised to other European countries: the ideal-types may fit the British and German 
economies fairly well, but they are not necessarily applicable elsewhere. Research is needed 
on other economic settings and frameworks, such as the emerging market economy model of 
Eastern Europe. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical research on varieties of capitalism has made substantial progress, with 
interesting results that corroborate this approach (Witt and Jackson 2016). Most of the work 
bears on the relationship between context and firms’ comparative advantage (Schneider and 
Paunescu 2012). This article has sought to advance our knowledge of the state employment 
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relationship in different contexts, focussing on the labour force component of middle 
managers. Very little work has tried to determine the portion of the difference in the wage 
premium to supervision between Britain and Germany depends on the institutional context. 
The data help to account for national differences in remuneration while also highlighting 
some contrasting patterns.  
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Economy Germany United Kingdom
Variable
Sample   
Middle 
Managers
Other 
Employees
Middle 
Managers
Other 
Employees
Job Characteristics 
Wage (euros) 2924.85 1627.57 3474.70 1920.11
Middle managers 74.66 38.74 61.26
Permanent position 91.08 95.22 95.55 98.52
Full-time position 63.99 86.40 70.86 88.98
Individual Characteristics 
Age (average) 45.18 44.78 43.78 44.33
Gender (male) 66.50 42.65 55.08 43.57
Married 92.40 62.29 62.29 65.39
Local 97.68 98.25 94.74 95.55
Education Primary 0.41 0.62 0.00 0.00
Lower secondary 1.70 5.77 5.00 13.73
Upper secondary 34.88 49.33 48.71 58.48
Post-secondary (not tertiary) 7.58 8.56 3.63 4.30
Tertiary 55.42 35.71 42.66 23.49
Skills Level 4 63.28 45.66 71.99 32.06
(ISCO-88) Level 3 17.97 27.99 16.91 39.00
Level 2 12.22 12.09 5.23 7.93
Level 1 6.53 14.25 5.86 21.02
Firm Characteristics 
Firm size (% > 10 employees) 84.01 80.54 86.21 82.74
Sector of economic activity
Agriculture and fishing 1.14 1.06 0.69 0.7
Manufacturing, mining, electricity 20.77 26.84 15.91 14.92
Construction 4.65 6.94 5.04 6.33
Wholesale, retail trade, repair services 14.47 13.97 14.05 10.23
Hotels and restaurants 1.47 2.25 2.15 3.01
Transport, storage and communication 6.16 5.51 6.92 5.16
Financial intermediation 6.24 5.61 4.69 4.84
Real estate, renting, business activities 9.01 8.46 10.5 11.99
Public administration and defence 9.17 6.99 10.08 12.03
Education 6.08 4.27 13.44 11.25
Health and social work 14.13 12.45 12.62 14.77
Other 6.71 5.65 3.93 4.77
Number of Observations
8588 6609
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
This table reports information on our sample's job characteristics (average wage, % of middle
managers, % of individuals with a permanent position, a full-time position), their individual
characteristics (average age, % of males, marital status, local status, education achieved, skill
level), and the firm's characteristics (% with more than 10 employees, economic sector). It also
shows the number of observations in the Germany and the UK.
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Germany
Figure 1. Wage Dstribution in the UK and Germany
This figure reports the total distribution of wages for both the UK and Germany (Panels 1 and 3, respectively) and
then the distributions for middle managers and other types of employees in each country (Panels 2 and 4,
respectively). The distributions were estimated by applying the Gaussian kernel and the Silverman rule for the
bandwidth.
The UK
Panel 4
Panel 2
Panel 3
Panel 1
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Sample Gemany UK
Model (a) (b) (c) (d)
i. 112.2 142.32 90.61 57.63
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ii. 166.09 150.36 229.10 150.58
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
iii. 73.13 97.55 84.87 101.81
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
iv. 76.87 408.26
(0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo-R
2
0.090 0.105 0.094 0.166
Correct Predictions (%) 62.1 73.9 66.6 71.0
Firm (4 dummies for the firm size, 13 
dummies for the economic sector)
Skills (4 dummies for the skills associated 
with the type of occupation)
Table 2. Results with Joint Exclusion for  Auxiliary Probit Regressions
The Table reports the results from the joint exclusion for the probit model's estimation that an
employee is middle manager for both Germany and the UK.
Joint Exclusion of the Following 
Characteristics:
Individual (gender, marital status, local, 
education, exp, exp
2
, exp
3
, exp
4
)
Job (part/full-time, temp/perm)
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Panel 1 Panel 2
Figure 2. Wage Premium for Middle Managers in the UK and Germany
This figure reports the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for the UK, with a smoothed difference,
and reports the same for Germany. The distributions were estimated by applying the Gaussian kernel and
the Silverman rule for the bandwidth to the samples.
The UK
Germany
Panel 1 Panel 2
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Country Germany United Kingdom
Kolgomorov-Smirnov Statistic 0.0625 0.0833
(0.018) (0.000)
Wage Premium At UK - Germany
Mean 0.160 0.259 0.100
Decile
0.1 0.231 0.265 0.034
0.2 0.195 0.277 0.081
0.3 0.154 0.239 0.084
0.4 0.148 0.221 0.073
0.5 0.135 0.226 0.091
0.6 0.120 0.246 0.125
0.7 0.118 0.259 0.141
0.8 0.130 0.262 0.131
0.9 0.164 0.284 0.120
Table 3. Wage premium for Middle Managers in Germany and the UK
This table reports the Kolgomorov and Smirnov statistic for equality of actual and counterfactual
distributions of wages, and the WPS measured at the mean, and at the deciles of the wage
distribution. p -values were associated with the null hypothesis of equality of distributions. 
p -value
Figure 3. Wage Premium for Middle Managers in Germany and the UK at the mean and
at different deciles of the wage distribution
This figure reports the WPS measured at the mean, and at the deciles of the wage distribution. 
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Sample All Individuals
Model (a) (b)
i. 1234.9 1220.6
(0.000) (0.000)
ii. 234.7 259.4
(0.000) (0.000)
iii. 268.3 246.7
(0.000) (0.000)
iv. 97.6
(0.000)
Pseudo-R
2
0.189 0.197
Correct Predictions (%) 58.9 59.9
Firm (4 dummies for the firm size, 13 
dummies for the econocmic sector)
The skills (4 dummies for the skills 
associated with the type of occupation)
Table 4. Results from Joint Exclusion  For Auxiliary Probit Regressions
This table reports results from the joint exclusion for the probit model's 
estimation that an employee is German.
Joint Exclusion of the 
Following Characteristics:
Individual (gender, marital status, national or 
EU citizenship, education, exp, exp
2
, exp
3
, 
exp
4
)
Job (part/full-time, fixed-t./perm)
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Panel 1 Panel 2
Figure 4. The Impact of the UK Context on the WPS in Germany
Panel 1 reports the actual distribution of wages and the distribution that would have prevailed if the
German employees had been working in the UK.  Panel 2 reports the counterfactual distribution if none 
of the employees had been a supervisor (solid line), and the counterfactual distribution if none of the
employees had been a supervisor and the German employees had been working in the UK.
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Methodological Appendix 
In what follows, we present some technical details of the approach we adopt. A.1. summarizes and 
provides some examples of the non-parametric estimate approach for the distribution of wages; A.2. 
summarizes the inverse probability weighted approach, which allows us to answer some “what” 
questions related to the economies; A.3. discusses the choice of the set of regressors to model the 
probability of being a middle manager for international comparison and presents some empirical 
exercises; A.4. presents some empirical exercises; and A.5. discusses estimations of “what if” 
questions related to the economies analysed and a reference economy. 
A.1. Non-parametric approach to estimating the distribution of wages 
The appeal of estimating and comparing the distribution (of the ln of) wages relies especially on the 
possibility of theorizing directly about the entire distribution of wages, which, in turn, negates the 
need for a representative agent. 
Distributions can be estimated using parametric and nonparametric frameworks. However, the 
former typically make use of only a given number of moments (usually the first two - the 
conditional mean and the variance), while the latter allows for analysis of the entire distribution of 
the variables of interest. The use of a nonparametric approach when estimating distributions allows 
us to go beyond the idea of a representative agent. This explains its appeal in analyses of behaviour 
in large and heterogeneous samples of individuals, as in our case. 
Following Silverman (1986), let us define a wide class of nonparametric density estimators (the 
Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel density estimator) as: 
(1) ( ) 




 −
= 
= h
ww
K
hN
i
N
i 1
hN,
11
w fˆ , 
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where N is the number of observations, w is the ln of wage and h is the bandwidth. K(.) is the kernel 
density function which satisfies: 
(2) ( )

−
=1dppK . 
Many alternative kernel functions can be used, each of which offers different advantages and 
disadvantages, especially in terms of efficiency and smoothing power. In our analysis, we make use 
of the Gaussian kernel, which is the height of the standard normal distribution evaluated at (w – wi) 
given the bandwidth h. We use the Gaussian kernel because of its property of monotonicity of peaks 
and valleys with respect to changes in the smoothing parameter (Sheather, 2004). 
h is the crucial decision in the estimation of distributions using a nonparametric approach. A 
number of bandwidth selectors is available. In what follows, we report the results based on the 
average of the optimal rule of thumb proposed by Silverman (1986) since it is generally 
acknowledged to be the best performing, especially when the kernel density function applied to the 
data is Gaussian, as in our case. It should be noted that, given the large numbers in our sample, the 
choice of kernel function and bandwidth selector are unlikely to affect the results significantly. 
Marron and Schmitz (1992) suggest that comparisons across distributions should be made under the 
condition that the same kernel K(), and the same smoothing parameter h are adopted in Eq. (1). 
In Figure A.1., Panels 1 and 2 report the results for the sample of employees and the subsample of 
middle managers and productive employees in the UK. Panels 3 and 4 report the results for 
Germany. 
A.2. Answering “what if” questions: the semi-parametric approach to estimate distributions 
The differences across the distributions in Panel 2 (and Panel 4 for Germany) cannot be taken as 
being the premiums for middle management in the UK and Germany, because they do not take 
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account of the difference in the personal characteristic endowments of middle managers with 
respect to the control group. In other words, use of the fully nonparametric density estimation 
approach makes it difficult to perform hypothesis testing exercises. 
Therefore, as suggested by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), we compare the estimate of the 
nonparametric distribution of wages with the distribution estimated under some “what if” questions, 
the so-called counterfactual distributions, that is, the distributions that would have prevailed in the 
economy if the impact of “being a middle manager” were removed. 
 
Panel 3 Panel 4
Figure A.1. The distribution of wages in the UK and Germany across subsamples
The Figure reports distribution of wages in UK and Germany (Panels 1 and 3, respectively) and for the
subsample of middle managers and productive employees (Panels 2 and 4, respectively). The distributions are
estimated applying the Gaussian kernel and the Silverman rule for the bandwidth.
The UK
Panel 1 Panel 2
Germany
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Since Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), a number of methods have been proposed to decompose 
differences in the means of an outcome variable that are attributable to a number of independent 
variables. We are interested in the distribution of wages and rely on methods for decomposing 
distributional parameters other than the mean. In our work, we adopt the Inverse Probability 
Weighting (IPW) originally proposed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) in the context of the 
gender wage gap literature. This method is preferred if the aim, as in our case, is decomposition of 
the overall difference in the distribution of the outcome variable into its explained and unexplained 
components, which is described as aggregate decomposition. Its main advantage lies in its 
simplicity. Let: 
(3) dxxlxwgwf )()()( =  
be the actual distribution of wages, where w is the wage, )( xwg  is the conditional density of wages 
and )(xl  is the density of the vector of x characteristics, among which the dummy variable m is 
equal to 1 if the individual is a middle manager and zero otherwise. The approach consists of 
comparing the distribution in Eq. (1) with the distribution of wages that would prevail if, other 
things being equal, none of the individuals was a middle manager: 
(4) dxxlxwgwf nmnm )()()( = , 
where nm denotes ‘not managers’ and ( )xwg nm  is the conditional density of wages associated to 
this group of observations. The wage premium to management is taken as the horizontal difference 
between the distributions in Eq. (1), the actual distribution of wages, and Eq. (2), the counterfactual 
distribution of wages, that is, the distribution of wages that would prevail if none of the individuals 
was a middle manager, other things being equal. This condition is obtained by using in Eq. (2) the 
density of the vector of x characteristics )(xl  associated to the entire sample instead of )0( =mxl , 
and the density of the x characteristics associated to the subsample of observations for which m=0. 
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The distribution in Eq. (2) is obtained following DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), who suggest 
exploiting Bayes law to obtain its estimate: 
(5) 
)0(
)0(
)0()(
xmpr
mpr
mxlxl
=
=
== , 
where )0( =mpr  and )0( xmpr =  are the unconditional and conditional probabilities respectively 
of not being a middle manager. Use Eq. (3) in Eq. (2) to obtain: 
(6) ( ) dxmxlxwgxwf nmnm )0()()( ==  , 
where: 
(7) 
)0(
)0(
)(
xmpr
mpr
xnm
=
=
= . 
The authors note that Eq. (4) is the distribution of wages associated to the nm subsample up to the 
unknown re-weighting function, )(xnm . This reweighting function is the crucial element in the 
decomposition of the distribution of wages and is built by estimating a probit model to obtain the 
conditional probability of supervising other employees given x: 
(8) )()1( xxmpr == , 
and using the predicted values: 
(9) 
)1(ˆ1
)1(ˆ1
)(ˆ
xmp
mp
xnm
=−
=−
= , 
where (.)pˆ  is the fitted probability. 
Eq. (7) gives the estimate of )(xnm  needed to reweight the distribution of wages for the subsample 
of employees who are not middle managers in Eq. (2). These weights are used to compute the 
otherwise fully non-parametric Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel density estimator: 
(10) ( ) 




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The decomposition is performed for the UK and Germany separately. Comparison of these results 
provides evidence in favour of or against our hypothesis (1). 
A.3. Adapting the method to international comparisons: which control variables? 
Apart from using the same kernel and the same smoothing parameter for the two samples, the 
decomposition exercise requires the same specification of the probit model in Eq. (8) for the UK 
and Germany. Therefore, in estimating the models, we do not apply a general-to-specific approach 
since this is likely to make the reduced form economy-specific, and we test the joint significance of 
the following groups of variables: 
(v) variables for individual characteristics: education (4 categories: at most lower secondary 
school, upper secondary, post-secondary education, at least tertiary); work experience (and 
its squared, cubic and quartic values); gender; marital status; and two dummies for 
citizenship type (national/non national, European/non-European); 
(vi) variables associated with job characteristics (part time, full time, temporary, permanent); 
(vii) variables associated with firm characteristics (size measured by 3 dummy variables, sector 
of economic activity based on 13 dummy variables); 
(viii) variables for individual skills (4 dummy variables measuring the skills required for the 
task). 
The variables described in (i), (ii) and (iii) are drawn from DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). 
Combined with the regressors described in (iv), they help to deal with the likely heterogeneity in the 
data and potential self-selection mechanisms. For instance, if the individual skills of middle 
managers and other employees differ systematically because the former self select into more 
rewarding tasks (Card, 1999), then the measure we estimate is an unknown combination of the 
premium to management and the reward for individual skills endowments. The decision to 
supervise other employees or not depends upon the abilities required for the particular 
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responsibility, which will result in skilled individuals systematically self-selecting into that job 
(Cameron and Heckman, 1998). 
The literature on the gender wage gap suggests that this problem should be handled by adopting a 
panel data approach (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2010). However, in our context, this is not feasible 
since the EU-SILC survey data are cross sectional. In our context, using panel data would be 
unattractive also because: 1) the estimating probability model is non-linear so the assumption of 
separability is unlikely to hold; and 2) disentangling individual effects is problematic since 
individual fixed effects can be computed only if the individual experiences both statuses (being a 
supervisor and not being a supervisor) over the (eventually available) time span. Therefore, we 
follow Picchio and Mussida (2011) and use the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-88). These variables are associated with the type of job chosen by the individual. The 
categories range from jobs that require a relatively low level of skill, such as plant and machinery 
operators and assemblers, to jobs that require professional skills such as legislators and senior 
officials, and CEO/non-CEO positions. The variables refer explicitly to the skill level required for 
the job: 
the basis for the classification in the ISCO-88 scheme is the nature of the job itself and 
the level of skills required. A job is defined as the set of tasks and duties to be 
performed. Skills are the abilities to carry out the tasks and duties of a job. Skills 
consist of two dimensions: skills level and domain specialization (EU-SILC 2009). 
We take the number of accurate predictions for the different models as the criteria for choosing 
among the alternative reduced form models. We note that, because the counterfactual wage 
premium is computed as the difference between premiums, the potential residual bias due to self-
selection mechanisms is further dissipated unless there are reasons to expect that skilled individuals 
working in the UK self-select into jobs differently from German individuals. 
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A4. Wage as a proxy for ability, and endogeneity 
The four sets of variables described in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) help to deal with the likely 
heterogeneity in the data, and self-selection mechanism. We note that the decision to supervise 
other employees depends also upon the wage paid for this responsibility. In turn, this may result in 
skilled individuals systematically self-selecting into that job (Cameron and Heckman, 1998). 
Hence, another variable that could be used to control for self-selection into middle management 
jobs is the wage attached to the job. It is worth studying the impact of wage on the forecasting 
ability of the reweighting functions when added to the set of regressors. Results reported in Table 
A1 are for the auxiliary probit regression when (the log of) wage is added to the set of regressors. 
 
Table A1 Columns (a) and (b) report the results for Germany. As above, we test for the joint 
significance of groups of variables using the F-statistic (p-values are in brackets). Column (a) 
Sample Germany The UK
Model (a) (b) (c) (d)
43.91 61.83 33.65 24.50
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ii. The job (part/full time, temp/perm) 13.96 19.1 23.87 32.80
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
144.11 153.11 128.93 123.81
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
28.16 182.92
(0.000) (0.000)
v. (log of) wage 157.01 116.18 309.14 156.75
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo-R
2
0.121 0.126 0.1589 0.192
Percentage of correct predictions 0.646 0.661 0.691 0.717
Table A1. Results on auxiliary probit regressions: the role od wage
iv. The skills (24 dummies for the skills associated ot the 
type of occupation)
Test for joint exclusion of the 
characteristics of:
i. The individual (gender, marital status, national, EU 
citizenship, education, exp, exp
2
, exp
3
, exp
4
)
iii. The firm (4 dummies for the size of the firm, 13 
dummies for the sector of activity)
The Table reports the results from estimation of the probit model for Germany and the UK.
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reports the results for the model with wage included in the sets of variables for individual, job and 
firm characteristics. As expected, wage is statistically significant. If both the set of ISCO variables 
and the log of wage are included in the estimated models (Column b), the F-statistics associated to 
the statistical significance of (the log of) wage and the joint statistical significance of the 
coefficients of the ISCO dummies, reduce relative to their counterparts in Column (b) Table A1 in 
the main part of the paper. This is likely due to correlation between the ISCO variables and the log 
of wages, suggesting that the former, as expected, help to control for the self-selection mechanism. 
However, with respect to the results for our preferred model reported in Column (b) in Table A1, 
both these models have a significantly lower percentage of correct predictions; recall, that this is 
what these auxiliary regressions are meant to help with. In Table A1, Columns (c) and (d) report the 
results applied to the UK observations. The pattern is similar to the pattern for Germany. As before, 
adding the (log of) wage to the set of regressors reduces the percentage of correct predictions and, 
in the case of the UK, also the pseudo-R² of the model. The results in Column (d) show that the set 
of ISCO variables is correlated to wage and they have higher F-statistics.  
The evidence that the models that include in the set of regressors the log of wage, have a 
lower percentage of correct predictions, suggesting the use of the models where this variable is 
excluded from the set of regressors. This adds to the problem of finding a credible instrumenting 
strategy for wage. Wage is likely to be jointly determined with the probability of being a supervisor 
and, therefore, its use is conditional on the availability of the set of instruments to be used in the 
instrumental variables approach (Currie and Madrian, 1999). The problem lies in identifying one or 
more credible instruments. This is difficult in our context because the instrument must be valid (and 
the same) for the two economies under investigation. 
The literature suggests adopting variables measuring individual health. It is suggested that 
poor health has substantive effects on compensation and labour market participation. It has been 
suggested also that the relationship between health status and the task the individual performs is not 
strong, the idea being that health is likely to affect all the tasks the individual chooses, in a similar 
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manner (Currie and Madrian, 1999). In the EU-SILC survey, physical well-being is measured by 
limitation on activities due to health problems, and general health (including health status and 
chronic illness or condition) and is summarized by a variable that takes values from 1 to 5, with 
higher values indicating poorer health. The variable is not statistically significant in the probit 
model, suggesting that the exclusion restriction is likely to hold. Moreover, correlation analysis 
supports this conclusion since the variable is found to be highly correlated to the wage and 
uncorrelated to the probability of being a supervisor. Table A2 reports the results with individual 
health status used as an instrument for (the log of) wage. 
 
Sample Germany The UK
Model (e) (f) (m) (n)
18.38 18.67 34.83 23.35
(0.031) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000)
ii. The job (part/full time, temp/perm) 6.93 5.17 26.41 26.47
(0.031) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000)
70.81 68.26 89.84 100.62
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3.23 15.86
(0.198) (0.000)
v. (log of) wage 20.76 12.44 0.16 0.53
(0.000) (0.000) (0.687) (0.468)
Pseudo-R
2
Percentage of correct predictions 0.646 0.504 0.658 0.686
H0: (log)wage is exogenous χ
2
-stat 0.010 0.260 0.146 0.084
iv. The skills (24 dummies for the skills 
associated ot the type of occupation)
Table A2. Results on auxiliary probit regressions: instrumenting wage
The Table reports the results from estimation of the probit model for Germany and the UK.
Test for joint exclusion of the 
characteristics of:
i. The individual (gender, marital status, 
national, EU citizenship, education, exp, exp
2
, 
exp
3
, exp
4
)
iii. The firm (4 dummies for the size of the firm, 
13 dummies for the sector of activity)
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Table A2 Column (a) reports the results for Germany. Wage is statistically significant at the 
1% s.l. The Hausman and Wu test for exogeneity rejects the null hypothesis that the variable can be 
treated as exogenous. The percentage of correct predictions is lower than that reported for our 
preferred model. The results in Column (b) show that, if the set of dummies controlling for 
unobserved skills is added to the set of regressors, the percentage of correct predictions reduces 
further, and the coefficient associated to (the log of) wage also reduces. The test for exogeneity 
does not reject the null that wage can be treated as exogenous. Columns (c) and (d) report results for 
the UK observations. If we instrument the (log of) wage we find that the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman and Wu test is not rejected. This suggests that, despite the proposal in Currie and Madrian 
(1999), the necessary exclusion restriction is unlikely to hold for both the UK and Germany. The 
log of wage is not statistically significant. 
A.5. Answering “what if” using questions related to the economies with the UK as the 
reference economy 
To test hypothesis 2, we need a measure of how much a German middle manager would earn if, all 
other things being equal, s/he was performing the same task in the UK. This amount, when 
compared to the management premium actually earned, will reveal the impact of the German 
compared to the UK institutional background. 
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010) conduct this exercise in two steps. The first step consists of 
estimating the counterfactual distribution that would prevail if German employees were working in 
the UK, all else being equal: 
(11) dxGerxlxwgwf
GerukGer )0()()(/ ==  . 
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As above, the key element in comparing across samples (in this case, countries) is the reweighting 
function, which keeps all the conditioning variables as in the UK. Then, the reweighting factor for 
the observations in Germany is: 
(12) 
)1(
)0(
)0(
)1(
)0(
)1(
)(/
=
=

=
=
=
=
=
=
UKpr
UKpr
xUKpr
xUKpr
UKxpr
UKxpr
xUKGer . 
They suggest implementing the decomposition by pooling the data for Germany and the UK, and 
running a probit model for the probability of being employed in the Germany given the set of 
characteristics x: 
(13) )()1( xxUKpr == . 
and, using the sample proportions )(ˆ Gerp  and )(ˆ Gerp , they construct the distribution of wages that 
would have prevailed were all the German employees working in the UK: 
(14) 
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ /
UKp
Gerp
xGerp
xUKp
xukger = . 
where two unconditional probabilities of the first ratio, )(ˆ GERp  and )(ˆ UKp , are equal to the 
percentage of observations for the German economy over the percentage of observations for the UK 
economy. This vector of weights, when applied to the sample of German employees, gives: 
(15) ( ) dxGerxlxwgxwf GerUKGerUKGer )0()()(// ==  , 
which is an estimate of the wage distribution that would prevail in Germany under UK institutions. 
The first step in the exercise provides an evaluation of the role of institutional background, that is, 
how much any German worker would earn in the UK. A similar exercise can be found in DiNardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) for the case of the gender wage gap. It focuses on a single economy and 
constructs counterfactual distributions at different points in time. The impact of a particular factor 
on changes to the wage distribution over time is constructed by considering the counterfactual state 
of the world where the distribution of this factor remains fixed across time. Blau and Kahn (1996), 
again in the context of the gender wage gap literature, propose a comparison across economies. As 
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in our case, they adopt the UK economy as the benchmark and investigate what would be the 
average wage premium for a German woman working in the British institutional context. 
The second step consists of estimating how much a German middle manager would earn in the UK, 
other things being constant. This vector of weights comes from the interaction of the vector of 
weights in Eq. (12) and Eq. (7), from which we deduce the reweighting function (Blau and Kahn, 
1996; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998; Katz and Autor, 1999): 
(16) 
)1(ˆ1
)1(ˆ1
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ
)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ /  /
xmp
mp
UKp
Gerp
xGerp
xUKp
xxx ukgernmandukger
=−
=−
==  . 
which, when applied to the sample of German employees, gives: 
(17) dxmGerxlxwgxwf GernmandUKGernmandUKGer )0,0()()()(   /  / ===  , 
This provides the premium that would be paid to German middle managers working in the UK. The 
counterfactual wage premium to management is taken as the horizontal difference between the 
distributions in Eq. (1), the actual distribution of wages in Germany, and Eq. (15). In turn, the 
difference between the wage premium German middle managers are paid and the counterfactual 
wage premium they would receive if UK institutions prevailed, provides a measure of the role of 
the institutional context in the German economy. 
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